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Abstract 
Design errors can severely jeopardize safety and contribute to failures in construction and engineering projects. Such 
failures can have devastating economic, environmental and social consequences. Significant efforts have been made 
to reduce the incidence of failures through learning from previous disasters and events by modifying building and 
engineering codes and standards accordingly. Design errors, however, remain an innate feature of construction and 
engineering projects. Most errors are identified during construction and require rework, but there is always a potential 
for some to remain undetected and contribute to failure, and as a result potentially contribute to accidents and loss of 
life. This paper examines the circumstances and issues that contributed to a series of construction and engineering 
failures, to enable development of a systemic learning framework to contain and reduce design errors and potential 
failures and accidents.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of design errors and their resultant cumulative negative impact upon the structural 
integrity of buildings and the financial performance of organizations and projects is a recurrent problem 
within the construction and engineering sectors (e.g., Wantanakorn et al., 1999; Wardhana and 
Hadipriono, 2003). The collapse or distress contained within a structural element can be a result of an 
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error.  Design errors are a major cause of accidents and research has revealed that gross errors can cause 
80 to 90% of the failures occurring on buildings, bridges and other civil engineering structures (Matousek 
and Schneider, 1976).  Despite the considerable amount of research that has addressed failures in 
construction and engineering facilities, design errors remain a constant threat. From structural and geo-
technical engineering perspectives, lessons have been learnt from several prominent failures such as the 
New World Hotel, Highland Towers, Sampoong Department Store, the World Trade Centre towers. 
Building and engineering standards have been modified and improved in many countries such as 
Australia, United Kingdom (UK), United States (US) and Singapore. Despite such modifications and 
improvements, inappropriate organizational and managerial decisions, practices and procedures prevail 
within many design and construction firms, which can adversely impact an individual’s cognition. As a 
result of cognitive impairment, the propensity for an individual to commit errors considerably increases, 
especially when time and cost constraints are being imposed on design tasks and processes (Manavazhi, 
2004). 
Errors contained within design documentation have been identified as a major problem during the 
construction of projects (Manavazhi, 2004).  The nature and severity of errors made varies significantly 
between projects. In particular, as projects increase in size there is a proclivity for errors to increase.  
Most errors that are made in design documentation are identified by the contractor, subcontractor or 
manufacturers prior to or during construction. If they are not identified then the ramifications may be 
colossal if a failure occurs. Errors contained within contract documentation alone can contribute to a 5% 
increase in a project’s contract value (Cusack, 1992).  Such costs would be significantly higher in the 
event of an engineering failure and consequent loss of life.  The concept of failure has been espoused as a 
unifying principle for successful design, but according to Petroski (1989) there is a danger of designing 
by emulating success as designers may overlook critical structural, economic, political and aesthetic 
issues that require greater consideration. Replication without an understanding of context and constraints 
can invariably lead to errors and failure.   Significant failures that have occurred in construction and 
engineering facilities due to errors are examined. A systemic learning framework for reducing design 
errors and potential failures is then propagated.  Considering the degree of knowledge and the 
advancements that have been made in areas such as structural analysis and design, structural reliability, 
material science, and technology, construction and engineering facilities should not be failing once they 
have been constructed as risks are known or can be predicted ‘a priori’. Issues for terrorism and other 
malicious acts however pose on-going problems for structural engineers.  
2. ERRORS AND FAILURES 
Errors have become an innate feature of the design process in construction and engineering (Love et al., 
2009). Errors occur due to physiological and psychological limitations of humans. It is a matter of 
contention whether individuals can justifiably be blamed for all errors, as making mistakes is an innate 
characteristic of human nature (Reason, 1990).  Human errors occur for various reasons and therefore 
different actions are needed to prevent or avoid the different sorts of error experienced in construction and 
engineering facilities. Regardless of the skill level, experience or training that individuals possess, errors 
and omissions may be made at any time. According to Reason and Hobbs (2003) errors involve a 
deviation of some kind, whether a departure from an intended course of action, departure from a path of 
actions planned toward a desired goal or a deviation from the appropriate behavior at work. An error can 
arise due a mistake, non-compliance, slips or lapses. Even the most qualified and highly competent 
individual can make a mistake or mishap. Indeed, Reason (2000) contends that it is often the best 
individuals that commit mistakes with the worst consequences. The general understanding, however, of 
the adverse effects of errors is better understood than the potential benefits that can be acquired through 
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learning to prevent their occurrence (van Dyck et al., 2005). Lessons that can be learnt from accidents, 
crises or events, have been identified as an integral component of an organization’s ability to learn 
(Choularton, 2001).  
Wardhana and Hadipriono (2003) define failure “as the incapacity of a constructed facility or its 
components to perform as specified in the design and construction requirements” (p.152).  More 
specifically, a structural failure refers to loss of the load-carrying capacity of a component or member 
within a structure or of the structure itself. Structural failure is initiated when the material is stressed to 
its strength limit. This causes a fracture or excessive deformations. In a well-designed system, a 
localized failure should not cause immediate or even progressive collapse of the entire structure such as 
that experienced in 1968 at Ronan Point in the UK, which killed four people (Ellingwood, 2006).  
Failures arise because of deficiencies in design and detailing, or the inappropriate specification of 
substandard materials.  Deficiencies that manifest themselves as errors and result in a failure may occur 
because of lapses, slips, mistakes, and omissions during the design process, or downstream in the 
construction and/or maintenance phases of a constructed facility’s life cycle. Design errors can be 
significantly reduced when design checks are undertaken prior to construction commencing.  Schneider 
(1997) has revealed that through rigorous design checks 32% of errors can be detected. In addition, if an 
independent third party is used then as much as 55% of design errors could be accounted for. While 
design checks and verifications are useful for identifying errors their usefulness is somewhat limited if 
lessons are not learnt from previous projects and appropriate training and skill development is put in place 
for individuals and teams.  
3. EXAMPLES OF CONSTRUCTION AND ENGINEERING FAILURE 
Common factors that contribute to failures to occur include inadequate structural redundancy; lack of 
consideration for loadings; defective connection detailing; calculation errors; misusing computer software; 
detail constructability problems; and unclearly communicated design intent. In addressing these causes a 
number of significant construction and engineering failures that have occurred are examined.  
The collapse of the hanging walkway at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City in 1981, which killed 
113 people and injured more than 200 others, was attributable to an erroneous connection detail. A 
detailed chronology of events contributing to this cataclysmic disaster has been widely documented (e.g., 
Pfatteicher, 2000). A defining feature of the hotel was its lobby. It featured a multistory atrium crossed 
with suspended concrete walkways on the second, third, and fourth levels. The fourth floor bridge was 
suspended directly over the second floor bridge, with the third floor walkway set off to the side several 
meters away from the other two. Difficulties during construction led to a subtle but flawed design change 
that doubled the load on the connection between the fourth floor and walkway support beams and the tie 
rods carrying the weight of both walkways. The engineers failed to review the initial design thoroughly, 
and accepted the contractors proposed plan without performing basic calculations that would have 
revealed its serious intrinsic flaws — in particular, the doubling of the load on the fourth-floor beams. 
The new design could not handle the dead load weight of the structure and the spectators standing on it. The 
connection failed and both walkways crashed one on top of the other and then into the lobby below. The 
two walkways were suspended from a set of steel tie rods, with the second floor walkway hanging directly 
underneath the fourth floor walkway. The walkway platform was supported on three cross-beams 
suspended by steel rods retained by nuts. The cross-beams were box beams made from C-channels welded 
toe-to-toe. The original design called for three pairs of rods running from the second floor all the way to 
the ceiling. Investigators determined that this design supported only 60% of the minimum load required 
by the building codes (Moncraz and Taylor, 2000).  
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In a prominent case that occurred on the premises of Charles de Gaulle International Airport in France, 
a portion of the terminal roof collapsed and four people were killed and three injured in 2004. The results 
from an administrative inquiry revealed that an array of procedural and structural issues were to be blame 
for the collapse. It was found the concrete vaulted roof was vulnerable to exterior temperature swings. 
Sources close to the enquiry also disclosed that the whole building chain had worked as close to the limits 
as possible, so as to reduce costs. In particular, it was pointed out that there margin for safety was also 
minimal. Upon further investigation, structural surveyors concluded that the roof was beyond repair and 
so the entire vault of Terminal 2E had to be demolished and re-built at a significant expense; €130 million 
or US$205 million. Subsequent legal proceedings failed to apportion sole responsibility for the event 
because of uncertainty and interdependency of events that led to the failure occurring.  
The collapse of Melbourne’s West Gate Bridge in 1970, which killed 35 people and injured many 
others, was primarily due to a culmination of minor ‘errors upon errors’ that were committed in the 
design of box-girder bridge (Public Record Office Victoria, 2005). Two years into construction of the 
bridge, a 112 meter span between two piers collapsed. Many of those who perished were on lunch break 
beneath the structure in site huts, which were crushed by the falling span. Others were working on and 
inside the girder when it fell. On the day of the collapse there was a difference in camber of 11.4 cm 
between two half girders at the west end of the span that needed to be joined. It was proposed that the 
higher one be weighted down with 10 concrete blocks, each 8 tons, which were located on site. The 
weight of these blocks caused the span to buckle; a sign of structural failure. The longitudinal joining 
of the half girders was partially complete when orders came through to remove the buckle. As the bolts 
were removed the bridge snapped back and the span collapsed.  Despite the significance of this accident, 
omissions, errors of judgement, inefficiencies and communication failures remain prevalent within the 
construction industry (Love et al., 2008; Love et al., 2009). Additionally, mistakes form an integral part 
of the design documentation that is produced by both architects and engineers primarily due to schedule 
pressure imposed by clients. 
The Hotel New World in Singapore collapsed in 1986. Thirty three people were killed. An inquiry 
investigating the cause of the accident tested for many potential causes such as concrete composition 
(Thean et al., 1987). Sections of concrete were tested to ensure they were to proper construction standards, 
and it was revealed that they were.  Construction work of the underground railway tunnel workers who 
had assisted in the rescue were also investigated, even though the excavations were more than 100 yards 
from the collapsed building. The inquiry revealed the derivative source of the collapse retrospectively was 
due to “when the structural design was still on the drawing board” placing responsibility on the structural 
engineer. In addition, the following causal factors were also attributed as determinants: 
y the unsatisfactory quality of construction; 
y substantial loads that were inadequately provided for the structural design but were added to the 
building and caused overloaded and poorly constructed structure to burdened; and 
y lack of proper maintenance 
Fundamentally, the structural engineer had made a serious error in calculating the building's dead load.
The structural engineer had calculated the building's live load, the weight of the building's potential 
inhabitants, furniture, fixtures and fittings. However the building’s dead load was completely omitted 
from the calculation. This meant that the building constructed could not support its own weight. Collapse 
was therefore imamate. 
Lawsuits taken against the engineering consultants United Research Services (URS) and Progressive 
Contracting (PCI) over the fatal collapse of the I-35w bridge collapse in Minneapolis have been filed 
(Brown, 2009). URS were responsible for checking the bridge and maintenance work undertaken by PCI. 
The investigation undertaken by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) revealed the 
bridge designer to be at fault as the gusset plates used to connect load-bearing columns and trusses had an 
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inadequate load bearing capacity. The NTSB found that 24 gusset plates had been woefully under 
designed on the I-35w being only half the thickness required. In addition to oversights that occurred 
during the original design review, subsequent design reviews completed (most notably during the bridge’s 
modification) failed to adequately cater for increased traffic volumes. This case has forced dramatic 
changes to work practices, and bridge design and maintenance procedures to be undertaken in the US. 
4. SYSTEMIC LEARNING FRAMEWORK 
Many of the examples of engineering failure cited above could have been avoided. It would appear 
that time and cost constraints, in many instances, led to omission errors. An absence of design checks and 
reviews juxtaposed with cost cutting procedures, such as in the case of the Westgate Bridge, and I-35w 
Minneapolis Bridge appear to be the main contributors to failures. With this in mind, error reduction and 
prevention should be viewed as a continuous process, rather than a product of certain activities or 
behaviors, as it involves an exploration of people, organizations and project systems. In doing so, this 
process enables the mapping of dependencies and interfaces that influence the error prevention process. 
Furthermore, viewing error prevention as a continuous process implies that learning from errors is a 
collective capacity that can produce the knowledge needed for individual, organizational and project-
related error prevention practices. Given the complexity of the project environment within which 
designers work, the production of a collective capacity would involve the learning processes of not only 
design organizations but the entire project team. Based upon the above examples cited, a systemic r 
learning framework for design error and failure reduction is propagated in Figure 1.  
The ideal approach to error reduction is to view errors as symptoms of underlying problems so they 
become sources of information to understand how systems work (Love et al., 2009).  Design errors and 
the resultant rework and failures should be viewed as tools that can be used to define margins of risk and 
safety so that learning how to prevent them can occur. This approach is based on the premise that humans 
are fallible, errors must be expected and individuals’ poor performance is a non-issue. Instead the focus 
should be on the failure in procedures, processes, teams and the organization. Emphasis is on feedback 
and knowledge acquisition from work processes, information, reflection discussion between colleagues 
and other project team members. The use of reviews at each stage of a project’s life cycle also provides 
the impetus for ‘real-time’ learning to take place.  Learning about error causation through interaction and 
participation with others is deemed an effective learning milieu for their prevention (Love et al., 2009). A 
‘community of practice’ can be used to formalize situating knowledge and learning, though the extent to 
which it learns internally or imports new knowledge is in part a function of the nature practices it 
undertakes (Love, 2009). The situated dimensions of learning are concerned with its practical and social 
aspects within a context. Most designers learn on the job in culturally embedded ways. This learning 
evolves through participation and interaction of people and their collective sense-making activities as they 
develop their competencies and construct their identities to function effectively. Interaction is a perquisite 
for learning how to prevent errors, as it enables the sharing of experiences to be acquired. This situated 
perspective may encourage designers to understand the necessity for project learning and interaction so as 
to make ‘sense’ of their activities.  
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 Figure 1. Systemic learning framework for error and failure reduction 
While situated learning is effective for error prevention, an individual’s capacity to learn can be 
adversely influenced by the conditions they are subjected to (Reason, 2000). Design organizations need to 
foster a leadership enriched culture and structure that engenders groups and teams to develop error free 
work practices, as their prevention can only be achieved to a limited extent by interventions at an 
organizational level. Fundamentally, people need to take responsibility for their actions and take the 
necessary precautions to not succumb to slips and lapses. In overcoming issues pertaining to memory and 
lapses in consciousness, personal aids such as post-it notes and tie-on labels have been found to be 
effective reminders (Reason, 2002). In addition, if incentives (e.g. remuneration and additional leave) are 
used to motivate people to improve process quality, then an individual’s ability to learn and reduce errors 
can increase.  Providing designers with adequate time to produce documentation, implementing audits, 
reviews and verifications, and using computer-aided design applications will go some way to containing 
errors, but not mitigating them. Similarly, at the project level, the implementation of constructability 
analysis, building information modeling, benchmarking, champions of practice, quality management, risk 
management, alliancing and integrated procurement methods can also be used to contain errors, but there 
is a limit to the extent to which they can be eliminated using these strategies. Furthermore, such strategies 
are rarely, if at all, implemented simultaneously during the delivery of construction and engineering 
projects. If they were, then many of the problems that arise in projects due to safety, rework, claims and 
disputes could be prevented. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Design errors are a symptom of dysfunctional organizational and managerial practices that prevail 
within the construction industry. They significantly contribute to cost and schedule growth, and rework. 
Furthermore, they jeopardize safety and are major contributors to accidents that occur during and post 
construction. Significant failures were drawn upon to highlight the adverse role that errors and failures 
can have upon the safety of workers and the general public. Many of the failures that have occurred could 
have been prevented if design checks and reviews had been undertaken and appropriate managerial and 
project management practices had been implemented. Instead cost and time pressures appear to be 
prevailing nemeses contributing to errors and failures. A systemic learning framework is propagated to 
reduce errors and failures. It is suggested that an array of strategies should be implemented incongruence 
at a project, organizational, and people level. If such strategies are no adopted, then it will only be a 
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matter of time before the next major construction and engineering failure occurs. Learning from the past 
is the first step toward attaining improvement. Taking action is an even bigger step, as it requires major 
cultural and behavioral change, which is urgently needed within the construction industry. 
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